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Abstract
Boolean games (BGs) are a framework for specifying strategic games in which the utility
of an agent is determined based on the satisfaction of goals in propositional logic. The
majority of existing work on BGs relies on the often unrealistic assumption that agents have
perfect knowledge of each other’s preferences. In this paper, we show how this issue can
be addressed in a natural way, by replacing the use of classical logic for expressing agents’
goals by possibilistic logic. We consider two such settings. In the ﬁrst setting, possibilistic
logic is used to encode knowledge about other agents’ goals with diﬀerent levels of certainty.
In the second setting, which is based on generalized possibilistic logic, certainty levels are
instead used to compactly encode priorities, while incompleteness is modelled in a binary
way, similar as in epistemic modal logics. In both cases we introduce natural solution
concepts, motivated by Schelling’s theory on focal points: a certain pure Nash equilibrium
(PNE) is preferred over another one due to the fact that all agents know it to be a PNE.
Alternatively, an outcome might be preferred when all agents consider it possible of being
a PNE. We prove that the associated computational complexity of these solution concepts
does not increase compared to PNEs in Boolean games with complete information. Finally,
to illustrate the practical relevance, we consider an application to negotiation, among others
showing how knowledgeable agents can obtain a more desirable outcome than others.
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1. Introduction
Game-theoretic frameworks often rely on the somewhat artiﬁcial assumption that agents
are fully aware of each other’s goals. In strategic settings, agents might deliberately conceal
such information, or might not have had a chance to exchange it. Even if an agent knows
its opponents well, it may not be fully certain about what exact goals the other agents are5
pursuing. For instance, suppose Alice and Bob are married and plan a night out. The
options are going to the theatre and attending a sports game. Even if we assume that Alice
and Bob have been married for an eternity and know each other inside out, they are not
mind readers: it is still possible that Alice is not entirely sure whether Bob really prefers
to join her to the theatre over attending the sports game alone. Games with incomplete10
information [1, 2] allow us to explicitly model the limitations of agents’ knowledge about the
preferences of the others. While this topic has been extensively researched for normal form
games, Boolean games with incomplete information have hardly received any attention; see
Section 2 for a discussion.
In this paper, we study the use of possibilistic logic [3] to model Boolean games with15
incomplete information. Possibilistic logic has the advantage of staying close to classical
logic, while oﬀering us more ﬂexibility, and it can be naturally used to model (partial) ig-
norance [4]. Speciﬁcally, we study two diﬀerent settings which diﬀer in how the necessity
degrees from the possibilistic logic theories are interpreted. In the ﬁrst setting, we consider
the usual interpretation of necessity degrees as certainty degrees. It uses possibilistic know-20
ledge bases to encode necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the satisfaction of other agents
subgoals. For instance, Alice can encode that she is absolutely certain that Bob reaches his
highest utility when they both attend the sports game, while she is less certain that Bob
reaches his highest utility when they both go to the theatre. We prove that this framework
at the semantic level corresponds to a possibility distribution over all possible games.25
In the second approach, necessity degrees are instead used to model preference. To
keep the ability to model incomplete information, for this setting we switch from standard
possibilistic logic to generalized possibilistic logic (GPL) [4]. In particular, each GPL theory
semantically corresponds to a set of possibility distributions. In our context, these possibility
distributions are interpreted as the utility functions that, according to a given agent, may30
correspond to the actual utility function of some other agent.
For both frameworks of Boolean games with incomplete information, we propose intuit-
ive solution concepts, reﬂecting whether agents know or consider it possible that a certain
outcome is a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). We prove that the computational complexity
of the associated decision problems does not increase compared to PNEs in Boolean games35
with complete information. To illustrate how these solution concepts could be useful, we
brieﬂy discuss an application to negotiation in Boolean games with incomplete information.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst discuss related work in
Section 2 and give some background on Boolean games and possibilistic logic in Section 3.40
Next we introduce our two approaches in Section 4 and Section 5. Finally, we present the
application to negotiation in Section 6. Finally note that this paper is an extension of our
2
work in [5] (Section 4) and [6] (Sections 5 and 6). In addition to providing more detailed
explanations and proofs, we have extended the framework from [5] with joint constraints
and have added complexity results to the framework from [6].45
2. Related Work
Although uncertainty has been studied extensively in the context of game theory (see e.g.
[1]), the literature on Boolean games with incomplete information is currently limited. Note
that we are only concerned with epistemic uncertainty in this paper (e.g. we do not consider
stochastic actions, whose outcome cannot be predicted with certainty). To the best of our50
knowledge, stochastic uncertainty has not yet been studied in the context of Boolean games.
Moreover, we are not aware of any existing approaches for modelling uncertainty w.r.t. the
goals of other agents, in the context of Boolean games, although uncertain Boolean games
have been studied for other purposes. For example, in [7] uncertain Boolean games are
modelled by introducing a set of environment variables which are outside the control of any55
agent. Each agent has some (possibly incorrect) belief about the value of the environment
variables. The focus of [7] is on manipulating Boolean games by making announcements
about the true value of some environment variables, in order to create a stable solution if
there were none without the announcements. In [8] uncertainty is modelled by extending the
framework of Boolean games with a set of observable action variables for every agent, i.e.60
every agent can only observe the values assigned to a particular subset of action variables.
As a result, agents are not able to distinguish between some outcomes, if these proﬁles only
diﬀer in action variables that are not observable to that agent. Three notions of veriﬁable
equilibria are investigated, capturing respectively outcomes for which all agents know that
they might be pure Nash equilibria (PNEs), outcomes for which all agents know that they65
are PNEs and outcomes for which it is common knowledge that they are PNEs, i.e. all
agents know that they are PNEs and all agents know that all agents know that they are
PNEs etc. The same authors have extended this framework to epistemic Boolean games [9],
in which the logical language for describing goals is broadened to a multi-agent epistemic
modal logic. Note, however, that agents are still fully aware of each other’s goals in this70
framework, i.e. [9] considers agents whose goal is to obtain a particular epistemic state. For
instance, I not only want my husband to pick up our baby, I also want to know he is picking
up our baby.
In contrast, we study Boolean games with incomplete information, considering agents
which have their own beliefs about the goals of other agents. Although probability theory is75
often used to model uncertainty in game theory [1], a possibilistic logic approach provides
a simple and elegant mechanism for modelling partial ignorance, which is closely related
to the notion of epistemic entrenchment [10]. Being based on ranking formulas (at the
syntactic level) or ranking possible worlds (at the semantic level), possibilistic logic has the
advantage of staying close to classical logic. As a result, we can introduce methods for80
solving possibilistic Boolean games that are closely similar to methods for solving standard
Boolean games.
Within the broader context of game theory, several authors have looked at qualitative
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ways of modelling epistemic uncertainty. A common approach is to model the beliefs of
an agent a about another agent b as a set of pairs (s, t), where s is a strategy and t is a85
so-called type (where types are used to model beliefs about beliefs in a hierarchical way).
Such a belief structure is sometimes called possibilistic in the game theory literature (e.g.
[11, 12]). However, it should be noted that these approaches are not related to possibility
theory in the sense of [13], and are thus diﬀerent in spirit from the “possibilistic” approach
we present in this paper. In particular, while the aforementioned approaches rely on a90
Boolean uncertainty model (i.e. a given strategy s is either considered possible or not), we
use possibility theory to model uncertainty (in Section 4) or preferences (in Section 5) based
on a ranking semantics.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Background on Boolean Games95
The logical language LΦ associated with a ﬁnite set of atoms Φ contains the following
formulas: (i) every atom of Φ, (ii) the logical constants ⊥ and ⊤, and (iii) the formulas ¬ϕ
and ϕ∧ψ for every ϕ, ψ ∈ LΦ. As usual, we use the abbreviations ϕ→ ψ ≡ ¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) and
ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). We write Lit(Φ) to denote the set of literals of the language LΦ, i.e.
Lit(Φ) = Φ ∪ {¬p | p ∈ Φ}. An interpretation of Φ is deﬁned as a subset ν of Lit(Φ) such100
that for every atom p ∈ Φ either p ∈ ν or ¬p ∈ ν. We denote the set of all interpretations of
Φ as Int(Φ). An interpretation can be extended to a satisfaction relation on LΦ in the usual
way. If a formula ϕ ∈ LΦ is satisﬁed by an interpretation ν, we denote this as ν |= ϕ. An
interpretation that satisﬁes a given formula is called a model of that formula. We denote
the set of models of ϕ as JϕK.105
Originally, the utilities in BGs were binary, but several extensions have been introduced
to allow more general preferences. Examples are the addition of costs [14], the use of a
prioritized goal base instead of a single goal [15, 5] or the use of many-valued  Lukasiewicz
logic to formalize the idea of weighted goal satisfaction [16]. In our paper, we use the
deﬁnition of a BG as stated in [5]. The latter is a particular case of generalized BGs [15]110
in which the preference relations are total. Additionally, we incorporate a constraint δ,
restricting the possible joint actions of the agents. This is a generalization of the constraints
in [17], which only restrict the individual actions of the agents. Such joint constraints might
at ﬁrst glance seem to conﬂict with the autonomous character of agents, since it creates a
dependency between their actions: the strategy choice of one agent can restrict the available115
strategies of another agent. However, such dependencies are clearly all around us: agents
cannot, for instance, buy the same house, complete the same one man’s job, marry the
same person etc. In particular, such dependencies naturally force agents to negotiate about
their strategy choices, which is the subject of Section 6. Moreover, since the Boolean game
framework with joint constraints is a generalization of the one from [17], we explain our120
theory for the former.
Definition 1 (Boolean Game). A Boolean game (BG) is a tuple G = (N , (Φi)i∈N , δ,
(Γi)i∈N). For every agent i in N = {1, . . . , n}, Φi is a ﬁnite set of atoms such that Φi∩Φj =
4
∅, ∀j 6= i. We write Φ =
⋃
i∈N Φi. For every i ∈ N , Γi = {γ
1
i ; . . . ; γ
p
i } is i’s prioritized goal
base. The formula γmi ∈ LΦ is agent i’s goal of priority m. We assume that every agent has125
p priority levels and that δ ∧ γmi 6|= ⊥ for every i ∈ N and m ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Finally, δ is a
consistent formula in LΦ, which encodes the integrity constraints of the game G.
The set Φ contains all action variables. Agent i controls Φi and can set these atoms to true
or false. We also write Φ−i = Φ \ Φi for the set of action variables outside i’s control. By
convention, goals are ordered from high (level 1) to low priority (level p).130
Example 1. Alice and Bob, who share a car, are planning their afternoon. Alice controls
Φ1 = {bA, fA, dA} and Bob controls Φ2 = {bB, fB}. Agent i can drive to the beach (set bi
to true) or to the forest (set fi to true). If Alice sets dA to true, she takes the dog with her.
The game is constrained by δ = ¬(bB ∧ fB) ∧ ¬(bA ∧ fA) ∧ (bB → ¬fA) ∧ (bA → ¬fB). In
words: neither Bob nor Alice can simultaneously go to the beach and the forest. Moreover,
if Bob goes to the beach then Alice cannot go to the forest and similarly Bob cannot go to
the forest if Alice goes to the beach. Alice and Bob’s goal bases are:
Γ1 = {fA ∧ fB ∧ dA; bA ∧ bB ∧ dA; dA}
Γ2 = {bB ∧ bA ∧ ¬dA; bB ∧ bA; fB ∧ fA}
Thus Alice’s ﬁrst priority is to go to the forest with Bob and her dog. If this is not possible,
she would like to go to the beach with Bob and her dog. Furthermore, we can infer that
Alice prefers staying at home with her dog over leaving without it. Bob prefers to take Alice
to the beach without the dog. However, he still prefers to go to the beach with Alice and
the dog over going to the forest with Alice, and he prefers going to the forest with Alice135
over all remaining possibilities.
Definition 2 (Outcome). An interpretation of Φ that satisﬁes δ is called an outcome of G.
We denote the set of all outcomes as S, i.e. S = JδK.
Given an outcome ν, we write ν−i for the projection of the outcome ν on Φ−i, i.e. ν−i =
ν∩Φ−i. Furthermore, we write Si(ν−i) for the set of partial outcomes νi ∈ Φi that can extend140
the partial outcome ν−i ∈ Φ−i, i.e. Si(ν−i) = {νi ∈ Int(Φi) | (ν−i ∪ νi) ∈ S}. Sometimes,
we will write an outcome ν as (ν−i, νi) to make explicit that the action variables from Φi
are chosen in accordance with νi in the outcome ν. In particular, (ν−i, ν
′
i) will denote a
modiﬁcation to the outcome ν in which the action variables for agent i are instead chosen in
accordance with ν ′i. For the ease of presentation, we deﬁne a utility function that is scaled145
to the unit interval.
Definition 3 (Utility Function). For each i ∈ N and ν ∈ S, the utility of i in ν is deﬁned
as
ui(ν) =
p+ 1−min{k | 1 ≤ k ≤ p, ν |= γki ∧ δ}
p
with min ∅ = p+ 1.
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, . . . , 1}.
We will denote the vector of utilities (u1(ν), . . . , un(ν)) corresponding to outcome ν as U(ν).
In Example 1, we have for instance:
U({fA, fB, dA,¬bA,¬bB}) = (1, 0.33),
U({bB, bA,¬fA,¬fB,¬dA}) = (0, 1),
U({bA, bB, dA,¬fA,¬fB}) = (0.67, 0.67),
U({fA, bB,¬fB,¬bA,¬dA}) = (0, 0).
Definition 4 (Pure Nash equilibrium). An outcome ν of a BG G is a pure Nash equilib-
rium (PNE) iﬀ for every agent i ∈ N , νi is a best response (BR) to ν−i, i.e. ui(ν) ≥ ui(ν−i, ν
′
i)
for all ν ′i ∈ Si.150
The concept of utility function highlights the close connection there is between Boolean
games and normal-form games (NFGs). The main diﬀerence between the two frameworks
is that in NFGs a utility value for each outcome is encoded explicitly, while in BGs utilities
are deﬁned implicitly based on logical formulas. This means that in practice, BGs can be
exponentially more compact than the NFG representation of the same game. Clearly, for155
every BG we can always construct an NFG that is equivalent to it (in the sense that it
induces the same utility function). Conversely, given an NFG in which all utilities belong
to Λp, we can always construct an equivalent BG as well (e.g. by introducing one action
variable for each action from the NFG, and adding the constraint that each agent has to
set exactly one of these action variables to true). Note that in this paper, we will only be160
concerned with solution concepts that rely on the relative ordering of the utility values, such
as PNEs (but unlike e.g. mixed equilibria). Clearly the requirement that all utilities belong
to Λp does then not restrict the kind of games that can be encoded. Furthermore note that
in ﬁnite settings, we can always model games with real-valued utilities, by considering an
injective mapping from utility scores in Λp to R. On the other hand, the results we present165
in this paper would not be directly applicable to settings where agents can choose between
an inﬁnite number of actions (as in  Lukasiewicz games [16]), nor in settings where utilities
are partially ordered.
In the context of bargaining (see Section 6), it is natural that agents try to achieve
an outcome that is, among others, eﬃcient. A well-known eﬃciency concept is Pareto170
optimality.
Definition 5 (Pareto Optimality). For every ν, ν ′ ∈ S it holds that ν Pareto dominates
ν ′, denoted as ν >par ν
′, iﬀ
(∀i ∈ N : ui(ν) ≥ ui(ν
′)) ∧ (∃i ∈ N : ui(ν) > ui(ν
′))
We denote the set of Pareto optimal outcomes in S as
PO = {ν ∈ S |¬(∃ν ′ ∈ S : ν ′ >par ν)}
6
Intuitively, an outcome is Pareto optimal if no agent can be better oﬀ without another agent
being worse oﬀ. It is easy to see that every BG has at least one Pareto optimal outcome.
A well-known reﬁnement of the Pareto ordering incorporating a notion of fairness is the
discrimin ordering [18]. To deﬁne it, we denote the set of agents whose utility is the same175
in ν and ν ′ as eq(U(ν),U(ν ′)), i.e. eq(U(ν),U(ν ′)) = {i ∈ N | ui(ν) = ui(ν
′)}.








We deﬁne the set of discrimin optimal outcomes as
DO = {ν ∈ S |¬(∃ν ′ ∈ S : ν ′ >discr ν)}
It is easy to see that >discr is a strict order relation on S. It holds that DO ⊆ PO and
DO 6= ∅. In Example 1, {bA, bB, dA,¬fA,¬fB} is the unique discrimin optimal outcome,
although it is not the only Pareto optimal outcome.
3.2. Background on Possibility Theory180
3.2.1. Possibility theory
Possibilistic logic (see e.g. [19] for a more comprehensive overview) is a popular tool
to encode and reason about uncertain information in an intuitive and compact way. The
semantics is deﬁned based on possibility distributions [13]:
Definition 7 (Possibility Distribution). A possibility distribution on the universeW is185
a mapping pi :W → [0, 1].
The elements of the universeW are referred to as possible worlds1. Let us denote an arbitrary
element of the universe W as ν. If pi(ν) = 1, ν is considered to be completely possible,
whereas pi(ν) = 0 corresponds to ν being completely impossible. A possibility distribution
such that pi(ν) = 1 for every ν ∈ W corresponds to a state of complete ignorance, since all190
options are completely possible. For instance, consider two possible worlds, denoted as w
and ¬w, corresponding respectively to a speciﬁc nation being weaponized or not. If one has
no information regarding the weapons of this nation, both worlds are completely possible, i.e.
pi(w) = pi(¬w) = 1. A possibility distribution pi is called normalized if at least one world is
considered completely possible, i.e. ∃ν ∈ W : pi(ν) = 1. Note that in contrast to probability195
distributions, there is no requirement that possibility distributions satisfy
∑
ν∈W pi(ν) = 1.
A possibility distribution encodes which worlds cannot be excluded based on available know-
ledge. Therefore, smaller possibility degrees are more speciﬁc, as they reﬂect a higher degree
of certainty that some worlds can be ruled out. For instance, suppose you suspect that your
neighbouring nation is weaponized. This could be encoded through the possibility distri-200
bution pi(w) = 1 and pi(¬w) = 0.5. If you have evidence that your neighbouring nation is
1Outside possibilistic logic, possibility distributions can also be deﬁned over universa that do not represent
possible worlds, e.g. the real numbers.
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weaponized (you are certain of it), this could be encoded through the possibility distribution
pi(w) = 1 and pi(¬w) = 0. The latter is more speciﬁc than the former. An ordering ≤ on
all possibility distributions on W can be deﬁned as pi1 ≤ pi2 iﬀ it holds that pi1(ν) ≤ pi2(ν),
∀ν ∈ W , assuming the natural ordering on [0, 1]. We say that pi1 is at least as speciﬁc as pi2205
when pi1 ≤ pi2. Given a set of possibility distributions, the maximal elements w.r.t. ≤ are
called the least speciﬁc possibility distributions, as these correspond to the smallest amount
of information. A possibility and necessity measure are induced by a possibility distribution
in the following way.
Definition 8 (Possibility and Necessity Measure). Given a possibility distribution pi




pi(ν); N(A) = inf
ν /∈A
(1− pi(ν))
Note that Π(A) measures the degree to which the event A is compatible with available210
evidence, whereas N(A) measures the degree to which the event A is implied by the available
evidence.
Example 2. Suppose a speciﬁc nation has two neighbouring nations. If the ﬁrst (respect-
ively the second) is weaponized, we denote this as w1 (respectively w2). Consider the universe
W = {{w1, w2}, {w1,¬w2}, {¬w1, w2}, {¬w1,¬w2}} and the possibility distribution pi onW :
pi({w1, w2}) = 1
pi({w1,¬w2}) = 0.4
pi({¬w1, w2}) = 0.4
pi({¬w1,¬w2}) = 0
Thus the nation considers it impossible that none of its neighbours is armed and has limited
certainty that both of the neighbours are armed. Now consider the event A that the ﬁrst
neighbour is weaponized, i.e. A = {{w1, w2}, {w1,¬w2}}. Then the possibility Π(A) is 1,215
i.e. it is completely possible that the ﬁrst neighbour is armed. The necessity N(A) is 0.6,
i.e. it is necessary to degree 0.6 that the ﬁrst neighbour is armed.
Another uncertainty measure which is sometimes used in possibility theory is called




In other words, ∆(A) reﬂects the degree to which all elements of A are considered possible.
This measure will be useful to express limitations on the knowledge of an agent.
3.2.2. Possibilistic logic220
Definition 9 (Possibilistic Knowledge Base). A possibilistic knowledge base is a ﬁnite
set {(ϕ1, α1), . . . , (ϕm, αm)} of pairs of the form (ϕi, αi), with ϕi ∈ LΦ and αi ∈ ]0, 1]. It
encodes a possibility distribution, namely the least speciﬁc possibility distribution satisfying
the constraints N(ϕi) ≥ αi.
8
Note that N(ϕ) is an abbreviation for N(JϕK) or thus N({ν ∈ Int(Φ) | ν |= ϕ}). When it is225
clear from the context, we abbreviate possibilistic knowledge base to knowledge base.
Example 3. Recall the context of Example 2. To encode the situation in which a nation
found evidence that at least one of its neighbouring nations is weaponized, it adds (w1∨w2, 1)
to its knowledge base. The corresponding constraint N(w1 ∨w2) ≥ 1 implies that the world
in which nation w1 and nation w2 are not weaponized is considered impossible. If the nation230
is rather certain that both of its neighbouring nations are weaponized, it adds (w1∧w2, 0.6)
to its knowledge base. This has the eﬀect that every world in which the neighbours are not
both armed has a possibility degree of at most 0.4. It is easy to see that the possibility
distribution encoded by these formulas is pi as deﬁned in Example 2.
The possibility distribution piK encoded by a knowledge base K is well-deﬁned because there
is a unique least speciﬁc possibility distribution which satisﬁes the constraints of K [3]. It
is given by
piK(ν) = min{1− α | (φ, α) ∈ K and ν 6|= φ}
235
The following inference rules are associated with possibilistic logic:
• (¬p ∨ q, α); (p ∨ r, β) ⊢ (q ∨ r,min(α, β)) (resolution rule),
• if p entails q classically, then (p, α) ⊢ (q, α) (formula weakening),
• for β ≤ α, (p, α) ⊢ (p, β) (weight weakening),
• (p, α); (p, β) ⊢ (p,max(α, β)) (weight fusion).240
The axioms consist of all propositional axioms with weight 1. These inference rules and
axioms are sound and complete in the following sense [3]: it holds that K ⊢ (ϕ, α) iﬀ
N(ϕ) ≥ α for the necessity measure N induced by piK. Another useful property is K ⊢ (ϕ, α)
iﬀ Kα ⊢ ϕ (in the classical sense) [19], with Kα = {ϕ | (ϕ, β) ∈ K, β ≥ α} the α-cut of K.
3.2.3. Generalized Possibilistic Logic245
Generalized possibilistic logic (GPL) is a recent extension of possibilistic logic which
has been introduced to model incomplete knowledge about the beliefs of another agent [4].
Whereas a possibilistic knowledge base corresponds to a single possibility distribution, a
knowledge base in GPL corresponds to a set of possibility distributions. Each of these
possibility distributions corresponds to a possible model of the beliefs of the other agent.250
Syntactically, the language of GPL uses propositional combinations of modal formulas of
the form Nλ(α), where Nλ(α) intuitively means that the necessity of α is at least λ. A
possibilistic knowledge base intuitively corresponds to conjunctions of such modal formulas.
In GPL, on the other hand, we can express formulas such asN1(α1)∨N1(α2), which encodes
the fact that we know that the other agent is either certain of α1 or certain of α2, but we255
are ignorant about which of these two possibilities is the case.
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Example 4. Suppose a speciﬁc nation is reacting to the fact that one of its two neighboring
nations is weaponized. While the considered nation knows which of its two neighbours is
weaponized, we do not possess this knowledge, and hence we cannot precisely model the
beliefs of that nation. However, we can encode the knowledge N1(w1) ∨ N1(w2), which260
states that we know that the nation either knows that w1 is the case or that they know that
w2 is the case.
Formally the language of GPL is deﬁned as follows:





, ..., 1} we have that NΛ(α) is a GPL formula. GPL formulas of this form265
are also called meta-atoms.
• If γ1 and γ2 are GPL formulas, then ¬γ1 and γ1 ∧ γ2 are also GPL formulas.
Interpretations in GPL are normalized possibility distributions pi, whose possibility degrees




, ..., 1}. Such a GPL interpretation pi satisﬁes the formula Nλ(α) iﬀ
N(α) ≥ λ, with N the necessity measure corresponding to pi. The notion of satisfaction270
is then extended to (sets of) propositional combinations of meta-atoms in the usual way.
We deﬁne a GPL knowledge base as a ﬁnite set of GPL formulas. An interpretation that
a satisﬁes all formulas of a GPL knowledge base K is called a model of K. The set of all
models of K will be denoted as Mod(K).
Note that the semantics of GPL are deﬁned in terms of lower bounds on necessity meas-
ures. However, because only ﬁnitely many certainty degrees are used, we can easily express
lower bounds on possibility measures as well. In particular, for α ∈ LΦ, we have that
Π(α) ≥ λ iﬀ Π(α) > λ − 1
k
, which is equivalent to N(¬α) < 1 − λ + 1
k
. This means that
syntactically we can express the constraint Π(α) ≥ λ using the GPL formula ¬N1−λ+ 1
k
(¬α).
For the ease of presentation, we will use the abbreviation inv(λ) = 1− λ+ 1
k
and:
Πλ(α) ≡ ¬Ninv (λ)(¬α)
If the set of atoms in Φ is ﬁnite, constraints of the form ∆(α) ≥ λ can also be expressed in





The guaranteed possibility measure is closely related to the notion of ‘only knowing’ from275
non-monotonic reasoning [20]. For example, a formula such as N1(α) ∧ ∆1(α) states that
the agent knows that α is true but nothing more than that.
Example 5. In the running example, N1(w1∨w2)∧∆1(w1∨w2) means that the considered
nation knows that one of its neighbors is weaponized but that it does not know which one it
is. This can be contrasted with N1(w1)∨N1(w2) which states that the nation knows which280
of its neighbors is weaponized, and with N1(w1 ∨ w2), which leaves in the middle whether
the considered nation knows which one of its neighbors is weaponized.
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The use of GPL formulas for expressing limitations on the knowledge of others is explored
in more detail in [4].
Finally note that the following links between the syntax and semantics of GPL can be
easily veriﬁed:
(K |= Nλ(α)) ≡
(
∀pi ∈ Mod(K), ∀ν ∈ W : (ν 6|= α)⇒ pi(ν) ≤ 1− λ
)
(K |= Πλ(α)) ≡
(




∀pi ∈ Mod(K), ∀ν ∈ W : (ν |= α)⇒ pi(ν) ≥ λ
)
4. Using Possibilistic Logic for Encoding Uncertain Boolean Games285
In this section, we show how Boolean games can be naturally extended to model situ-
ations in which agents are uncertain about other agents’ goals. We ﬁrst use uncertainty
measures from possibility theory to semantically deﬁne (solution concepts to) Boolean games
with incomplete information in Section 4.1. Then in Section 4.2 we present a syntactic char-
acterization of these semantics. We prove that the semantic and the syntactic approach290
are equivalent in Section 4.3. Finally, we characterize the computational complexity of the
related solution concepts in Section 4.4.
Throughout this paper, we consider Boolean games with prioritized goal bases (see Deﬁn-
ition 1). Recall that in these games, an agent is most eager to achieve the goal with the
highest priority. If this goal cannot be achieved, the agent will settle for the goal with the295
second-highest priority, etc.
Example 6. Bob and Alice are going out: they can attend a sports game or go to the
theatre. Alice – agent 1 – controls action variable a, and Bob – agent 2 – controls b. Setting
their action variable to true corresponds to attending a sports game; setting it to false
corresponds to going to the theatre. Bob and Alice’s ﬁrst priority is to go out together. If
they do not go out together, Bob prefers a sports game, whereas Alice prefers the theatre.
This can be represented as a Boolean game with priorities, where Alice’s and Bob’s goal
bases are:
Γ1 = {a↔ b;¬a}, Γ2 = {a↔ b; b}
Both agents have utility 2 in the PNEs {a, b} and ∅, which respectively correspond to
attending a sports game together and going to the theatre together.
Our aim in this section is to propose an extension to the Boolean game framework in
which agents can be uncertain about other agents’ goals. An important concern is that the300
resulting framework should still enable a compact and intuitive representation of games,
as this is the main strength of Boolean games. In Section 4.2 we will provide a compact
characterization of the semantics proposed in Section 4.1. Using this extended Boolean game
framework, we aim to determine rational behaviour for agents which are uncertain about
the other agents’ goals. We illustrate this with the following example.305
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Example 7. Consider again the scenario of Example 6, but now assume that Bob and
Alice are not fully aware of each other’s goals. For instance, if Bob knows Alice’s goal, but
Alice thinks that Bob does not want to join her to the theatre, then, based on their beliefs,
attending a sports game together is a ‘better’ solution than going to the theatre together.
Indeed, Alice believes that Bob will not agree to go to the theatre together (or might have310
an incentive to leave if he would go), but they both believe that the other will agree to
attend a sports game together.
The results presented in this section can easily be generalized to accommodate for par-
tially ordered preference relations. However, as modelling preferences is not the focus here,
we prefer the simpler setting of Deﬁnition 1, for clarity.315
For the ease of presentation, we will impose an additional restriction on the kind of goal
bases that are considered in our framework for Boolean games with incomplete information.
In particular, we will consider Boolean games G = (N, (Φi)i∈N , δ, (Γi)i∈N) satisfying the
conditions of Deﬁnition 1, in which each goal base Γi belongs to the following set:.
G = {{γ1; . . . ; γp} | (γ1 ∧ δ 6|= ⊥) ∧ ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , p} : γk ∈ LCNFΦ ∧ (k 6= p⇒ γ
k |= γk+1)}
(1)
with LCNFΦ all formulas of LΦ in conjunctive normal form. Note that we can make this
restriction without loss of generality as any goal base {γ1; . . . ; γp} violating the condition
γk |= γk+1 can be transformed into a semantically equivalent2 goal base which does satisfy
the restriction (1), namely {γ1; γ1 ∨ γ2; . . . ;
∨p
m=1 γ
m}. Moreover, the set of possible goal
bases is independent of the agent, i.e. every agent has the same set G of possible goal bases.320
4.1. Semantics of Possibilistic Games
In the considered setting, the set of agents N , the corresponding partitions of action
variables Φi, and the global constraint δ are known to all the agents. However, we assume
that agents are uncertain about the goals of the other agents. We can formalise this by
considering for each agent i a possibility distribution pii on the set of possible Boolean
games, where this latter set is deﬁned as follows:
BG(N,Φ1, . . . ,Φn, δ) = {(N, (Φi)i∈N , δ, (Γi)i∈N) | ∀i ∈ N : Γi ∈ G}
When the set N of agents, the action variables Φ1, . . . ,Φn and the constraint δ are clear
from the context, we abbreviate BG(N,Φ1, . . . ,Φn, δ) to BG. The knowledge of an agent i
about the goals of the other agents can then be captured by a possibility distribution pii over
BG, encoding agent i’s beliefs about what is the actual game being played. Note that this325
possibility distribution pii is diﬀerent for each agent.
Example 8. Recall the scenario of Example 6. Suppose Bob has perfect knowledge of
Alice’s preferences, then pi2 : BG → {0, 1}maps every Boolean game to 0, except the Boolean
2Here equivalent means that they induce the same utility function.
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games with the preference orderings of Example 6, i.e. the actual game being played is the
only one considered possible by Bob up to logical equivalence. Suppose Alice is certain that330
Bob wants to attend a sports game together, or attend the game on his own if attending it
together is not possible. Then pi1 : BG → {0, 1} maps all Boolean games to 0, except those
with the following preference orderings and corresponding payoﬀ matrix:
{a, b} =1 ∅ >1 {b} >1 {a}
{a, b} >2 {b} >2 ∅ =2 {a}
Bob \ Alice a ¬a
b (1, 1) (0.5, 0.5)
¬b (0, 0) (0, 1)
Our ﬁrst aim is to determine to which degree a speciﬁc outcome ν is necessarily or possibly
a PNE according to agent i. Intuitively, it is possible to degree λ that an outcome ν is a
PNE according to agent i iﬀ there exists a Boolean game G ∈ BG such that ν is a PNE in G
and such that agent i considers it possible to degree λ that G is the real game being played,
i.e.
Πi({G ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G}) = λ
Similarly, it is certain to degree λ that an outcome ν is a PNE according to agent i iﬀ for
every G ∈ BG such that ν is not a PNE, it holds that i considers it possible to degree at
most 1− λ that G is the real game being played, i.e.
Ni({G ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G}) = λ
Using the aforementioned degrees, we can deﬁne measures which oﬀer a way to distinguish335
between multiple equilibria, motivated by Schellings’ notion of focal points [21]. An equi-
librium is a focal point if, for some reason other than its utility, it stands out from the
other equilibria. In our case, the reason can be that agents have a higher certainty that the
outcome is actually a PNE. This motivation is similar as the one for veriﬁability in [8]: only
certain PNEs carry suﬃcient information such that the agents can tell that an equilibrium340
has been played. Such a property provides an argument to play such an equilibrium, instead
of the alternatives. Note that there might not exist an outcome which every agent believes
is necessarily a PNE, even when the (unknown) game being played has one or more PNEs.
In such cases, the degree to which various outcomes are possibly a PNE could be used to
guide decisions.345
When we consider PNEs from an epistemic game theory point of view, a PNE is a sensible
solution concept in games with complete information, as it corresponds to the fact that it
is common knowledge that every agent is acting individually rationally and thus playing a
best response. In other words: every agent knows that every agent plays a best response,
and thus has no incentive to individually deviate. Moreover, every agent knows that every350
agent knows that every agent plays a best response etc. When knowledge is incomplete,
this property is no longer valid. It makes sense to consider weakened properties, such as:
every agent believes that every agent is playing rationally. Note that to obtain common
belief, one should also model the beliefs of the other agents, and the beliefs of the beliefs
of the other agents etc. Such hierarchical beliefs have been studied for both probabilistic355
and Boolean models of agents’ beliefs. A standard technique for modelling such beliefs,
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proposed in [22, 23, 24], is to consider a notion of types. The main idea is to assign to
each agent a type, which determines its beliefs about the utilities and types of other players.
This allows us to express hierarchical beliefs without explicitly construction a hierarchical
model. Among others, this has the advantage that inﬁnite belief hierarchies can be encoded360
in a ﬁnite way. While a similar approach could be pursued in our possibilistic setting, for
simplicity we will focus on agents’ beliefs about the goal bases of other agents.
Definition 10. Given the possibility measures Πi for every agent i, the degree to which all
agents ﬁnd it possible that the outcome ν is a PNE is
poss(ν) = min
i∈N
Πi({G ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G})
Similarly, given the necessity measures Ni for every agent i, the degree to which all agents
believe it necessary that ν is a PNE is deﬁned as
nec(ν) = min
i∈N
Ni({G ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G})
4.2. Syntactic Characterization
While the two possibilistic solution concepts from Section 4.1 are useful, the formulation
in Deﬁnition 10 cannot directly be used in applications, since the number of Boolean games365
in BG is double-exponential. In this section, we present a syntactic counterpart which will
allow for a more compact representation of the agents’ knowledge about the game being
played, as well as a more eﬃcient implementation.
Definition 11 (Goal-Knowledge Base). A goal knowledge base (goal-KB) Kji of agent i
w.r.t. agent j contains formulas of the form (ϕ → gkj , λ) or (ϕ ← g
k
j , λ), where 1 ≤ k ≤ p,370
ϕ ∈ LΦ, λ ∈ ]0, 1] and g
k
j is a new atom, encoding agent j’s goal of priority k. We further




j , 1) | 1 ≤ k ≤ p−1}. Finally, we require that a goal-KB
Kji satisﬁes the following criteria, which we will refer to as goal-consistency :
• For every ϕ, ψ ∈ LΦ such that (ϕ → g
k
j , λ) ∈ K
j
i and (ψ ← g
k
j , µ) ∈ K
j
i , it holds that
ϕ |= ψ.375
• For all (ψ1 ← g
k
j , λ1), ..., (ψr ← g
k
j , λr) ∈ K
j
i it holds that ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ ψr ∧ δ 6|= ⊥.





{l | l ∈ ν} → gkj , λ) with λ ≥ min(λ1, ..., λr).
We will sometimes also encode Kji using formulas of the form (ϕ↔ g
k
j , λ) as an abbreviation
for the two formulas (ϕ→ gkj , λ) and (ϕ← g
k
j , λ). Furthermore, for the ease of presentation380
we do not normally mention the formulas the formulas {(gkj → g
k+1
j , 1) | 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1} in
examples, as these formulas belong to Kji by deﬁnition.
A goal-KB Kji captures the knowledge of agent i about the goal base of agent j. These
formulas express that, if agent j’s utility is at least p+1−k
p
, it is at least p−k
p
. Furthermore, the
information that we like to express in Kji consists of necessary and/or suﬃcient conditions385
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for the utility of agent j. For instance, agent i might believe with certainty λ that ϕ is
a suﬃcient condition for satisfying the goal with priority k, i.e. for achieving a utility of
at least p+1−k
p
. This is encoded as (ϕ → gkj , λ) ∈ K
j
i . Similarly, agent i might believe
with certainty λ that ϕ is a necessary condition for achieving the goal with priority k, i.e.
(ϕ← gkj , λ) ∈ K
j
i . These formulas can be combined as (ϕ↔ g
k
j , λ) ∈ K
j
i . Note how adding390
the atoms gkj to the language allows us to explicitly encode what an agent knows about the
goals of another agent. This is inspired by the approach from [25] for merging conﬂicting
sources, where similarly additional atoms are introduced to encode knowledge about the
unknown meaning of vague properties, in the form of necessary and suﬃcient conditions.
Example 10. Recall the scenario of Example 6. Suppose Bob has a good idea of what395
Alice’s goal base looks like: K12 = {((a ↔ b) ↔ g
1
1, 0.9), (((a ↔ b) ∨ ¬a) ↔ g
2
1, 0.6)}. He
is very certain that Alice’s ﬁrst priority is to go out together and rather certain that she
prefers the theatre in case they do not go out together. Although Alice is very certain that
Bob will be pleased if they attend a sports game together, she is only a little certain that
Bob would be just as pleased if they go to the theatre together. She knows Bob prefers to400
go to a sports game as a second priority. Her knowledge of Bob’s goal base can be captured
by K21 = {((a ∧ b)→ g
1
2, 0.8), ((¬a ∧ ¬b)→ g
1
2, 0.3), (b→ g
2
2, 1)}.






i , 1) for all k ∈
{1, . . . , p}, i.e. every agent knows its own goal base and the corresponding utility. However,
this assumption is not necessary for the results in this section. By requiring goal-consistency405
in Deﬁnition 11, we ensure that the knowledge base Kji only encodes beliefs about the goal
of agent j. Without this assumption, it could be possible to derive from Kji formulas of the
form ϕ→ ψ that are not implied yet by the constraints of the game, i.e. δ 6|= (ϕ→ ψ). Such
formulas encode dependencies between the action variables of agents, which might be useful
for modelling suspected collusion, but this will not be considered in this work. However,410
we do not demand that the beliefs of an agent are correct, i.e. we do not assume that each
agent considers the actual game possible.
Definition 12 (Boolean Game with Incomplete Information). A Boolean game with
incomplete information is a tuple G = (N, (Φi)i∈N , δ, (Γi)i∈N , (Ki)i∈N) with N, (Φi)i∈N , δ and
(Γi)i∈N as in Deﬁnition 1 and Ki the set {K
1
i , . . . ,K
n
i }, where K
j
i is a goal-KB of i w.r.t. j415
(see Deﬁnition 11).
Let us now consider how to compute the necessity and possibility that agent j plays a
best response in the outcome ν according to agent i. First recall that whenever we write an
interpretation ν where a formula is expected, this should be interpreted as the conjunction
of ν’s literals, i.e.
∧
{l | l ∈ ν}.420
Agent j plays a best response in the outcome ν iﬀ for every alternative strategy ν ′j ∈
Sj(ν−j) it holds that uj(ν) ≥ uj(ν−j, ν
′
j). Essentially this boils down to the fact that, for
some k ∈ {0, . . . , p}, uj(ν) ≥
k
p





. Note that for k = 0,
the ﬁrst condition is always fulﬁlled. Similarly, for k = p, the second condition becomes
trivial. Similarly, agent j does not play a best response in ν iﬀ there exists a ν ′j ∈ Sj(ν−j)425
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such that uj(ν) < uj(ν−j, ν
′









. The possibility of agent j playing a best response is dual
to the necessity of agent j playing no best response. These insights motivate the following
deﬁnition.
Definition 13. Let i, j ∈ N be two agents in a Boolean game with incomplete information430
G and let ν be an outcome of G. We denote gp+1j = ⊤ and g
0
j = ⊥ for every j. We say that
j plays a best response in ν with necessity λ according to i, written BRneci (j, ν) = λ, iﬀ λ is
the greatest value in [0, 1] for which there exists some k ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that the following
two conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Kji ⊢ ν → (g
k+1
j , λ)435
2. Kji ⊢ ((ν−j ∧ ¬νj)→ (¬g
k
j ∨ ¬δ), λ)
Let λ∗ be the smallest value greater than 1 − λ which occurs in Kji . Agent i believes it is
possible to degree λ that agent j plays a best response in ν, written BRposi (j, ν) = λ, iﬀ λ is
the greatest value in ]0, 1] for which there exists some k ∈ {0, ..., p} such that the following
two conditions are satisﬁed:440




2. ∀ν ′j ∈ Sj(ν−j) : K
j






If no such λ exists, then BRposi (j, ν) = 0.
Importantly, the syntax in Deﬁnition 13 allows us to express the certainty or possibililty
that an agent plays a best response, from the point of view of another agent. This forms an445
important base from which to deﬁne interesting solution concepts or measures in Boolean
games with incomplete information. In this paper, we introduce the following measures that
respectively reﬂect to what degree all agents believe it is necessary and possible that ν is a
PNE. In other words, the degree to which all agents believe it is necessary or possible that
all other agents will not have the incentive to deviate from the outcome.450
Definition 14. Let G be a Boolean game with incomplete information. For every out-
come ν ∈ S, we deﬁne the degree PNE nec(ν) to which ν is necessarily a PNE and the
degree PNE pos(ν) to which ν is possibly a PNE as follows:










In Section 4.3 below, we will show that these notions indeed correspond to the notions of
necessary and possible PNE that were deﬁned semantically in Section 4.1.
If we assume that all agents know their own goal, then BRneci (i, ν) = BR
pos
i (i, ν) = 0 if ν
is not a PNE. Consequently, if ν is not a PNE, then we have PNE nec(ν) = PNE pos(ν) = 0.
Note that the measures from Deﬁnition 14 induce a total ordering on S, so there always455
exists a ν ∈ S such that PNE nec or PNE pos is maximal.
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Example 10 (continued). LetG be the Boolean game with incomplete information, deﬁned
by the aforementioned goal-KBs, and assume that Bob and Alice know their own goals. It
can be computed that:
{¬a,¬b} {a,¬b} {¬a, b} {a, b}
minj∈N BR
nec
1 (j, .) 0.3 0 0 0.8
minj∈N BR
nec
2 (j, .) 0.9 0 0 0.9
PNE nec(.) 0.3 0 0 0.8
460
The outcome {a, b} has the highest value for PNE nec. Note that if Bob had the ‘dual’ beliefs
of Alice, i.e. K12 = {((¬a ∧ ¬b) → g
1
1, 0.8), ((a ∧ b) → g
1
1, 0.3), (¬a → g
2
1, 1)}, then {¬a,¬b}
and {a, b} both would have had value 0.3 for PNE nec.
In [26] we showed that many solution concepts for Boolean games can be found by using a
reduction to answer set programming. The concepts in this section, such as PNE nec, can be465
computed using a straightforward generalization of these ideas.
4.3. Soundness and Completeness
In this section, we show that the solution concepts for Boolean games with incomplete
information that were introduced in Section 4.2 indeed correspond to their semantic coun-
terparts from Section 4.1.470
With a given goal base Γj = {γ
1
j ; . . . ; γ
p
j } ∈ G we can associate a classical knowledge




j | k ∈ {1, . . . , p}}, which is simply encoding that each goal g
k
j is deﬁned
as in the goal base Γj. Using this formulation of a goal base as a logical theory, we can now
associate Kji with a possibility distribution pi
j
i on G in the following natural way, inspired
by [27], with max ∅ = 0:
piji (Γj) = 1−max{αl | (ϕl, αl) ∈ K
j
i , Tj 6|= ϕl} (2)
Note that Tj 6|= ϕl means that the goal base Γj does not satisfy the formula α. In other
words, it means that if Γj is the actual goal base of agent j, then the belief α of agent i
about this goal base is incorrect. The higher the certainty of the formulas violated by the
theory associated with Γj, the lower the possibility that Γj is the real goal base of agent j
according to agent i. Note that if we make the reasonable assumption that an agent knows
its own goals, then piii maps all elements of G to 0 except the real goal base
3 of i, which
is mapped to 1. Given the Boolean game with incomplete information G, and using the
possibility distributions on G for every j, we can deﬁne a possibility distribution piGi on the











j the goal base of agent j in the Boolean game G
′. This possibility distribution is
the natural semantic counterpart of the Boolean game with incomplete information G. We
now show that these possibility distributions piGi allow us to interpret the solution concepts
that have been deﬁned syntactically in Section 4.2 as instances of the semantically deﬁned
solution concepts from Section 4.1. This is formalized in the following proposition and475
corollary, which we prove further on. We use the notation brj(ν,Γj) for the propositional
variable corresponding to the statement “agent j with goal base Γj plays a best response
in ν”.
Proposition 1. For every ν ∈ S, i, j ∈ N and λ ∈ ]0, 1], it holds that
BRneci (j, ν) ≥ λ⇔
(
∀Γj ∈ G : ¬brj(ν,Γj)⇒ pi
j
i (Γj) ≤ 1− λ
)
(3)
BRposi (j, ν) ≥ λ⇔
(
∃Γj ∈ G : brj(ν,Γj) ∧ pi
j
i (Γj) ≥ λ
)
(4)
Corollary 1. Let us denote the possibility and necessity measure associated with piGi as Π
G
i
and NGi . For every ν ∈ S it holds that
NGi ({G
′ ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G′}) = min
j∈N
BRneci (j, ν) (5)
ΠGi ({G
′ ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G′}) = min
j∈N
BRposi (j, ν) (6)
Consequently, it holds that:
necG({G
′ ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G′}) = PNE nec(ν)
possG({G
′ ∈ BG | ν is a PNE in G′}) = PNE pos(ν)
Before we prove Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, a lemma is stated which deals with the
construction of speciﬁc goal bases in G, given speciﬁc knowledge bases encoding information480
about these goal bases.
Lemma 1. Given a goal-KB Kji , there exists a goal base Γj ∈ G such that pi
j
i (Γj) = 1.
Proof. We show that the condition piji (Γj) = 1 is satisﬁed for the goal base Γj = (γ
1
j ; . . . ; γ
p
j ),
with γkj a formula in CNF which is equivalent to
∧




j → ϕ, λ)}.
Indeed, ﬁrst note that due to the fact that Kji is goal consistent, we have γ
k
j ∧ δ 6|= ⊥. We485
also clearly have γkj |= γ
k+1
j for k < p, hence it holds that Γj ∈ G. To prove pii(Γj) = 1 we
have to show Tj |= φ for each (φ, α) ∈ K
j
i . By construction we already have that Tj |= φ




j . Since K
j
i , by deﬁnition of goal KB, is goal
consistent, it also follows that Tj |= φ for all φ of the form ϕ→ g
k
j .
Note that the construction of Γj relies on the (constrained) syntax of the formulas in K
j
i .490
We now prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. ⇒ of (3) Suppose BRneci (j, ν) ≥ λ and let Γj ∈ G. We show by
contraposition that piji (Γj) > 1 − λ implies brj(ν,Γj). From pi
j
i (Γj) > 1 − λ and (2), we
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ﬁnd that ∀(ϕl, αl) ∈ K
j
i : Tj 6|= ϕl ⇒ αl < λ. By Deﬁnition 13, BR
nec
i (j, ν) ≥ λ implies
that there exists a k′ ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that Kji ⊢ (ν → g
k′+1
j , λ) and K
j
i ⊢ ((ν−j ∧ ¬νj) →
(¬gk
′
j ∨ ¬δ), λ). It follows that Tj |= ν → g
k′+1
j and Tj |= (ν−j ∧ ¬νj) → (¬g
k′
j ∨ ¬δ).
Consequently, by deﬁnition of Tj, if k
′ ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}, it holds that Tj |= ν → γ
k′+1
j and
Tj |= (ν−j ∧ ¬νj)→ (¬γ
k′
j ∨ ¬δ). This means that j indeed plays a best response in ν since
γk
′+1
j ∧ δ is satisﬁed in ν (noting that ν |= δ by the deﬁnition of outcome) and for every
alternative strategy of j, γk
′
j ∧ δ is not satisﬁed.
⇐ of (3) Suppose that BRneci (j, ν) < λ, i.e. for every k ∈ {0, . . . , p} either K
j
i 0 (ν →
gk+1j , λ) or K
j
i 0 ((ν−j ∧ ¬νj) → ¬g
k
j ∨ ¬δ, λ). Let k
′ be the greatest index for which
Kji 0 (ν → g
k′
j , λ). Note that k
′ ≥ 1 because of (i). Furthermore note that we then have
Kji 0 (ν → g
k
j , λ) for all k ≤ k
′ and thus in particular for k = 1. We now construct a
goal base Γj = (γ
1
j ; . . . ; γ
p
j ) with γ
k
j deﬁned as follows. For k ≤ k
′, γkj is a formula in CNF
equivalent to Φk ∨ (Ψk ∧ ¬ν) where:
Φk =
∨
{ϕ |ϕ ∈ LΦ,K
j





{ψ |ψ ∈ LΦ,K
j
i ⊢ (ψ ← g
k
j , λ)}
For k > k′, γkj is a formula in CNF equivalent to Φk ∨Ψk.




j for k < p. To see why γ
1
j ∧δ 6|= ⊥,
note that γ1j = Φ1 ∨ (Ψ1 ∧ ¬ν) and that Ψ1 ∧ ¬ν ∧ δ |= ⊥ would mean that ν is the only
model of Ψ1 ∧ δ, which by deﬁnition of goal consistency would mean that K
j
i ⊢ (ν → g
1
j , λ),495
which is a contradiction.
Next we show that piji (Γj) > 1 − λ by checking that for every formula (ϕ, α) ∈ K
j
i with
α ≥ λ, it holds that Tj |= ϕ. This is clear for formulas ϕ of the form φ→ g
k
j and for formulas
of the form gkj → g
k+1
j . The fact that formulas of the form φ← g
k
j are satisﬁed can be seen
by the fact that then φ |= Ψk by deﬁnition of goal consistency.500
Finally we show that j does not play a best response in ν with the constructed Γj.
First note that because Kji 0 (ν → g
k
j , λ) for k ≤ k
′ we know that ν 6|= Φ, and thus
we have ν 6|= γkj for any k ≤ k
′. Moreover, since Kji ⊢ (ν → g
k′+1
j , λ) we must have
Kji 0 ((ν−j ∧ ¬νj) → ¬g
k′
j ∨ ¬δ, λ). It follows that ν−j ∧ ¬νj ∧ Ψk′ ∧ δ is consistent, which





⇒ of (4) Analogous to the proof of “⇐ of (3)”.
⇐ of (4) We prove directly that BRposi (j, ν) ≥ λ, i.e. ∃k ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that K
j
i 0 (ν →
¬gk+1j , λ
∗) and ∀ν ′j ∈ Sj(ν−j) : K
j





∗). By assumption, there exists a
Γj such that j plays a best response in ν and pi
j
i (Γj) ≥ λ. The former means that for




j such that (ν−j, ν
′
j) satisﬁes δ it holds that510








j, it then holds that Tj |= ν → g
k′+1
j . Since by
deﬁnition ν 6|= ⊥, Tj 6|= ⊥ and Tj 6|= ¬ν, it follows that Tj 6|= ν → ¬g
k′+1
j . The assumption
that piji (Γj) ≥ λ implies that ∀(ϕl, αl) ∈ K
j
i : Tj 6|= ϕl ⇒ αl ≤ 1 − λ. It follows that
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Kji 0 (ν → ¬g
k′+1
j , λ





holds for every ν ′j such that (ν−j, ν
′
j) satisﬁes δ implies that ∀ν
′
j ∈ Sj(ν−j) : K
j







We now prove Equation (5) from Corollary 1. The proof of (6) is analogous and the rest
of Corollary 1 follows immediately by minimizing over all agents in (5) and (6).
Proof of (5). By deﬁnition, minj∈N BR
nec
i (j, ν) ≥ λ iﬀ BR
nec
i (j, ν) ≥ λ for every j ∈ N . We
proved (Proposition 1) that the latter is equivalent with ∀Γj ∈ G : j no best response in520
ν ⇒ piji (Γj) ≤ 1 − λ. We ﬁrst prove that this implies that for all G
′ ∈ BG it holds that
piGi (G
′) ≤ 1 − λ if ν is not a PNE in G′. By deﬁnition, this means that NGi ({G
′ ∈ BG | ν
is a PNE in G′}) ≥ λ. Take an arbitrary G′ such that ν is not a PNE in G′. Then there
exists some j who plays no best response in ν if its goal base is ΓG
′
j . By assumption, this
implies piji (Γ
G′
j ) ≤ 1 − λ, which implies pi
G
i (G
′) ≤ 1 − λ by deﬁnition. We now prove the525
opposite direction. Take an arbitrary j and Γj such that j plays no best response in ν with
the goal base of j equal to Γj. Using Lemma 1, we can construct a G
′ ∈ BG such that
ΓG
′




j′ ) = 1 for every j
′ 6= j. Obviously ν is not a PNE in G′ since j plays
no best response. By assumption and by deﬁnition of NGi , it holds that pi
G
i (G
′) ≤ 1 − λ.
Since piij′(Γ
j′
G′) = 1 for every j
′ 6= j, it follows that piji (Γj) ≤ 1− λ. Due to Proposition 1, we530
proved that BRneci (j, ν) ≥ λ. Since j is arbitrary, it follows that minj∈N BR
nec
i (j, ν) ≥ λ.
Example 11. Recall the scenario of Example 8. We deﬁne the corresponding Boolean game
with incomplete information G. Since Bob has perfect knowledge of Alice’s preferences, his
goal-KB can be modelled as K12 = K
1
1 = {((a ↔ b) ↔ g
1
1, 1), (((a ↔ b) ∨ ¬a) ↔ g
2
1, 1)}.
Alice is certain that Bob wants to attend a sports game together, or attend the game on535
his own if attending it together is not possible. This can be captured by the goal-KB
K21 = {((a ∧ b) ↔ g
1
2, 1), (b ↔ g
2





the possibility distributions pi1 and pi2 described in Example 8. Despite Alice’s incorrect
beliefs, Bob and Alice are both certain that attending a sports game together is a PNE,
since necG({G
′ ∈ BG | {a, b} is a PNE in G′}) = PNE nec({a, b}) = 1. Contrary to Alice,540
Bob knows that going to the theatre together is a PNE as well.
An interesting question is how the agents’ beliefs can inﬂuence the proposals they can
make in e.g. bargaining protocols. Suppose for instance that in the above example, Alice
wants to make Bob a suggestion. Based on her beliefs, it would be rational to suggest
to attend a sports game together, as she believes that neither one of them would have545
an incentive to deviate from this outcome. Bob would then rationally agree, based on his
beliefs, as he is also convinced that neither one of them would deviate. We will study a simple
bargaining protocol in Section 6.1, although that protocol will be based on Boolean beliefs
(i.e. the setting from Section 5). Taking into account weighted beliefs in such protocols
remains a topic for future work, where for instance strength of belief could be related to550
the degree of risk-aversion of an agent. Another interesting question for future work is
how the actions of other agents can be used to modify one’s beliefs about that agent. For
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example, if Bob were to make a proposal, he can choose between two rational suggestions:
attending a sports game together or going to the theatre together. If he did the latter, Alice
would know that her beliefs are incorrect, if she assumes Bob makes rational suggestions.555
Other research possibilities lie in manipulating Boolean games with incomplete information
through communication, for instance through announcements, as investigated for Boolean
games with environment variables [7]. Another option is to extend the framework of Boolean
games with incomplete information, allowing agents to also reason about the beliefs of other
agents, although this is likely to lead to an increase in computational complexity.560
4.4. Computational Complexity
In this section two natural decision problems associated with the proposed possibilistic
Nash equilibria are investigated.
Proposition 2. Let G be a Boolean game with incomplete information and λ ∈ ]0, 1]. The
following decision problems are ΣP2 -complete:565
1. Does there exist an outcome ν with PNE nec(ν) ≥ λ?
2. Does there exist an outcome ν with PNE pos(ν) ≥ λ?
Proof. Hardness of 1 and 2 Both problems are ΣP2 -hard since they contain the Σ
P
2 -complete
problem to decide whether a Boolean game has a PNE as a special case. Indeed, when G
is a Boolean game, we can construct a Boolean game with incomplete information in which570
all agents have complete knowledge of each other’s goals. Then PNE nec(ν) and PNE pos(ν)
coincide and take values in {0, 1}, depending on whether ν is a PNE or not. Consequently,
G has a PNE iﬀ there exists a ν with PNE nec(ν) = PNE pos(ν) ≥ λ.
Membership of 1 We can decide the problem by ﬁrst guessing an outcome ν. Checking
whether PNE nec(ν) ≥ λ means checking whether BRneci (j, ν) ≥ λ for every i, j ∈ N . The575
latter involves checking possibilistic entailments, which can be done in constant time using
an NP-oracle. Therefore, the decision problem is in ΣP2 .
Membership of 2 We can decide the problem by ﬁrst guessing an outcome ν. Checking
whether PNE pos(ν) ≥ λ means checking whether BRposi (j, ν) ≥ λ for every i, j ∈ N . To see
that the latter can be reduced to checking a polynomial number of possibilistic entailments,
we need to rewrite the condition that ∀ν ′j ∈ Sj(ν−j) : K
j






this end, we deﬁne Kk, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, as the knowledge base Kji in which all
formulas deﬁning necessary and/or suﬃcient conditions for gkj are preserved; all formulas
with necessary conditions for glj (l ≥ k) are translated into necessary conditions for g
k
j by
replacing (ϕ → glj, α) by (ϕ → g
k
j , α); all formulas with suﬃcient conditions for g
l
j (l ≤ k)
are translated into suﬃcient conditions for gkj by replacing (ϕ ← g
l
j, α) by (ϕ ← g
k
j , α); all
other formulas are removed. Then it holds
∀ν ′j ∈ Sj(ν−j) : K
j














⇔ ∀ν ′j ∈ Sj(ν−j) : K
k






⇔ ∀ν ′j ∈ Int(Φj) : K
k





⇔ ∀ν ′j ∈ Int(Φj) : K
k




j ∧ δ) are consistent
⇔ ∀ν ′j ∈ Int(Φj) : K
k




j ∨ ¬δ) are consistent








where K′k1−λ is obtained from K
k
1−λ by replacing each occurrence of p ∈ Φ \ Φj by its truth
value (⊤ or ⊥) in ν, and similar for δ′. The last condition is equivalent with ((K′k1−λ)⊤ ∧
¬δ′) ∨ (K′k1−λ)⊥ being a tautology, where (K
′k
1−λ)⊤ is obtained from K
′k
1−λ by replacing each580
occurrence of gkj with ⊤ and similar for (K
′k
1−λ)⊥. Checking whether the latter expression is
indeed a tautology can be done with a SAT-solver, i.e. in constant time with an NP-oracle.
Therefore, the decision problem is in ΣP2 .
We can conclude that both problems are ΣP2 -complete.
The result of Proposition 2 shows that the complexity for the introduced measures does585
not increase compared to PNEs of Boolean games, since deciding whether a Boolean game
has a PNE is also ΣP2 -complete. Moreover, given the experimental results reported in [26]
for standard Boolean games, it seems plausible that a reduction to answer set programming
would support an eﬃcient computation of solutions for medium sized games.
5. Using GPL for Encoding Ignorance in Boolean Games590
In this section, we introduce an alternative framework to represent incomplete informa-
tion in Boolean games, using GPL to compactly encode what each agent knows about the
preferences of each agent. In particular, we will consider GPL knowledge bases Kji to encode
what agent i knows about the preferences of agent j. Each possibility distribution over Φ
will correspond to a utility function, where those utility functions that i considers possible595
utility functions of agent j will correspond to the models of Kji . Note that because i may
be uncertain about the utility function of agent j, we need GPL (where knowledge bases
may correspond to arbitrary sets of possibility distributions) rather than standard possib-
ilistic logic (where knowledge bases are naturally associated with a particular possibility
distribution).600
Although Section 4 also uses possibilistic logic to model incomplete information in
Boolean games, our motivation now diﬀers: whereas the previous section uses possibilistic
logic to encode graded beliefs about other agents’ goals, we now want to use possibilistic logic
to compactly describe agents’ preferences. In contrast to the approach from Section 4, the
weights associated with the formulas will now correspond to degrees of preference [28, 29]605
instead of degrees of certainty [3]. In particular the notion of uncertainty in this frame-
work, i.e. the way we model incompleteness, is binary: an agent either considers a given
utility function possible or impossible. Note that both the approach from Section 4 and
the approach from this section model incomplete information w.r.t. the agents’ preferences
(namely partial knowledge about the goals of the agents) in the context of Boolean games.610
However, to avoid confusion when referring to either one of them, we use the term Boolean
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game with incomplete information for the framework of Section 4, and the term Boolean
game with incomplete preference-information for the framework from this section.
Note that the approach presented in this section is clearly diﬀerent from approaches
that are aimed at modelling uncertainty in games, such as the Bayesian approaches that615
have been widely studied in the game theory literature (see e.g. [30]). Our use of GPL
also diﬀers from approaches such as CP-nets4, which despite their similar aim to compactly
model preferences, only capture a single preference structure and are thus less suitable for
modelling incomplete information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst research
on using GPL to model incomplete information about other agents’ preferences.620
5.1. GPL Encoding of Incomplete Boolean Games
We now explain in detail how GPL can be used to model incomplete information about
preferences in Boolean games with priorities. We use Example 1 as the running example of
this section.
Definition 15 (BG with Incomplete Preference-Information). A Boolean game with625
incomplete preference-information is a tuple G = (N , (Φi)i∈N , δ, (Γi)i∈N , (Ki)i∈N) with
N, (Φi)i∈N , δ and (Γi)i∈N as in Deﬁnition 1 and Ki = {K
1
i , . . . ,K
n
i }, where K
j
i is a GPL
knowledge base such that Kji |= N1(δ) and Mod(K
i
i) = {ui}.
For every two agents i and j in N the GPL knowledge base Kji encodes what agent i knows
about the preferences of j. Recall from Section 3.2.3 that Mod(K) are the models of K.630
These models are normalized possibility distributions over Int(Φ) which only take values
from {0, 1
p
, ..., 1}, which means that we can view them as utility functions. To reinforce this
view, throughout this section we will use the notation u to denote GPL interpretations,
rather than the more common notation pi. For a model u of Kji and an outcome ν, u(ν) =
l
p
then means that the utility of outcome ν for agent j is l
p
, if we take u to be the actual utility635
function of j. Each model u of Kji thus implicitly encodes the prioritized goal base {γ
1
j , ..., γ
p
j }
where γlj is equivalent to
∨
{ν | u(ν) ≥ p + 1 − l} (i.e. u(ν) = l
p
if the highest priority goal
from j that is satisﬁed in ν is γp+1−lj ). In this way, the GPL knowledge bases K
1
i , . . . ,K
n
i
compactly encode the BGs with priorities that agent i considers possible representations of
the actual game being played. Note that in contrast to the setting from Section 4, the link640
between the syntactic characterization from Deﬁnition 15 and the corresponding semantics
in terms of sets of BGs with priorities is immediately clear.
The condition N1(δ) ∈ K
j
i corresponds to the assumption that all agents are aware of the
integrity constraint δ. Speciﬁcally, it expresses that agent i knows that agent j’s utility is 0
for ν — the lowest possible payoﬀ — if ν violates δ (i.e. if ν is not an outcome). Finally, the
assumption that Mod(Kii) is a singleton {ui} in Deﬁnition 15 corresponds to the assumption
that agent i knows its own utility. If the actual goal base of agent i is given by (γ1i , ..., γ
p
j ),
4CP = ceteris paribus
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we can deﬁne Kii as follows:









i ∧ δ) |m ∈ {1, ..., p}} ∪ {N1(δ)}
Indeed, let ν ∈ Int(Φ) and suppose that u is a model of Kii. Suppose that ν |= δ and let




i ∧ δ) we have
u(ν) ≥ m
p
. If m < p we furthermore have that u(ν) ≤ m
p











i. If ν 6|= δ, then u(ν) = 0 because K
i
i contains the formula
N1(δ). For every ν ∈ Int(Φ) we thus have that the possibility degree u(ν) is completely
determined by Kii. In other words, K
i
i has a unique model u, which corresponds to the goal
base (γ1i , ..., γ
p
j ).
GPL formulas can be used to encode knowledge about preferences in an intuitive way.650
For instance, Kji |= Nλ(α) means that agent i believes that, whenever an outcome does not
satisfy α the utility of agent j can be at most 1−λ. In other words, α is a necessary condition
for agent j to reach utility higher than 1− λ. For example, in the context of Example 1, if
Bob believes that Alice is unhappy without her dog, this can be encoded by N1(dA) ∈ K
1
2:
whenever the dog is not with Alice, Alice’s utility is 0. Similarly, K |= ∆λ(α) means that655
agent i believes that agent j’s utility is at least λ whenever the outcome satisﬁes α. In other
words, α is a suﬃcient condition for j to reach a utility of λ or more. For instance, in the
context of Example 1, Bob can encode that Alice is at least partially happy when she is with
the dog, regardless of whatever else happens, by adding ∆ 1
3
(dA) to his knowledge base K
1
2.
This states that Alice’s utility is at least 1
3
when the dog is with her. Finally, K |= Πλ(α)660
encodes that agent i believes that there is some outcome that satisﬁes α in which agent j
reaches utility λ. For instance, in the context of Example 1, when Bob’s knowledge base K12
contains the formula Π1(dA ∧ (fA ∨ bA)), which encodes that Bob believes that Alice’s ﬁrst
priority goal can be satisﬁed when she takes the dog to the beach or the forest.
Rather than encoding bounds on speciﬁc utility scores, in some applications it may be
more natural to express comparative preferences, e.g. encoding that i believes that j prefers
any/some outcome satisfying α over any/some outcome satisfying β. To conveniently express
such knowledge, we will introduce some abbreviations for α, β ∈ LΦ:







(β)) ∨ ¬Π 1
p
(α) ∨∆1(β)








Intuitively, whenever Kji |= β  α, agent i knows that the utility of agent j in any outcome
that satisﬁes β is at least the utility of j in any outcome that satisﬁes α. Similarly, whenever
Kji |= β ≻ α, agent i knows that agent j strictly prefers any outcome in which β is true to
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any outcome in which α is true. Another useful abbreviation is:








Intuitively, whenever Kji |= β ≻c α, agent i knows that there is some outcome satisfying β665
with a utility that is higher than that of any outcome satisfying β.
We illustrate the expressiveness of GPL for modelling preferences in the following example.
Example 12. Recall the context of Example 1 and suppose Alice knows that Bob’s ﬁrst
priority goal can only be fulﬁlled without bringing the dog. This is encoded as N 1
3
(¬dA) ∈670
K21. If Alice knows that Bob prefers going to the beach exclusively with her over going to
the beach with her and the dog, this is encoded as (bA ∧ bB ∧ ¬dA) ≻ (bA ∧ bB ∧ dA) ∈ K
2
1.
When Alice believes that Bob has at least utility 2
3
when they both go to the beach, she
can encode this as ∆ 2
3
(bA ∧ bB). If Bob knows that Alice is unhappy without her dog, this
is encoded as N1(dA) ∈ K
1
2. To encode that Alice is at least partially happy when she is675





if Bob believes Alice’s top priority is to go to the beach together with the dog, he can add
∆1(bA ∧ bB ∧ dA) to his knowledge base.
Similar to Deﬁnition 13 and Deﬁnition 14, we deﬁne solution concepts which capture
that agents believe that a certain outcome is a PNE.680
Definition 16. Let i, j ∈ N be two agents in a Boolean game with incomplete preference-
information G and let ν be an outcome of G. We say that agent i knows that agent j plays
a best response in ν iﬀ it holds that Kji |= ν  ν−j. We say that agent i considers it possible
that agent j plays a best response in ν iﬀ it holds that Kji 6|= ν−j ≻c ν.
At the semantic level, agent i knows that agent j plays a best response in ν iﬀ this is the685
case for every utility function of j considered possible by i. Similarly, agent i believes it is
possible that agent j plays a best response in ν iﬀ this is the case for at least one utility
function of j considered possible by i.
Definition 17. Let G be a Boolean game with incomplete preference-information. For
every outcome ν ∈ S, we say that ν is a known PNE iﬀ every agent in the game knows690
that every other agent plays a best response in ν. Similarly, we say that ν is a possible PNE
iﬀ every agent in the game considers it possible that every other agent plays a best response
in ν.
Example 13. Recall the context of Example 12, where Alice’s and Bob’s knowledge bases
w.r.t. each other are:
K21 = {N1(δ),N 1
3
(¬dA), (bA ∧ bB ∧ ¬dA) ≻ (bA ∧ bB ∧ dA),∆ 2
3
(bA ∧ bB)}
K12 = {N1(δ),N1(dA),∆ 1
3
(dA),∆1(bA ∧ bB ∧ dA)}
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The possible PNEs correspond to the true PNEs: Bob and Alice go to the forest with the
dog or Bob and Alice go to the beach with the dog. The three of them going to the beach695
is the unique known PNE.
Note that we have not demanded that the knowledge of the agents is correct, i.e. the true
utility function is not ruled out as a possibility by other agents. However, if we do make
the assumption that all knowledge is correct, then it is easy to verify that any true PNE is
also a possible PNE. Also note that believing that some outcome ν is a possible PNE when700
it is not a true PNE is impossible when we assume that the agents know their own utility:
when ν is not a true PNE, the agent who does not play a best response does not consider it
possible that ν is a PNE.
5.2. Computational Complexity
In this section, we investigate the computational complexity of known and possible PNEs.705
Proposition 3. Let G be a Boolean game with incomplete preference-information. The
following decision problems are ΣP2 -complete:
1. Does there exist a known PNE?
2. Does there exist a possible PNE?
Proof. Hardness The problems are ΣP2 -hard since they contain the Σ
P
2 -complete problem710
to decide whether a Boolean game has a PNE as a special case. Indeed, when G is a Boolean
game, we can construct a Boolean game with incomplete preference-information G′ in which
all agents have complete knowledge of each other’s goals. In that case, known and possible
PNEs in G′ coincide with PNEs in G, thus G has a PNE iﬀ G′ has a known or possible PNE.
Membership We can decide whether a known PNE exists by ﬁrst guessing an outcome ν.715
Checking whether ν is a known PNE means checking whether agent i knows that agent j
plays a best response in ν for every i, j ∈ N . The latter involves checking possibilistic
entailments in GPL. Since the formula ν  ν−j contains the modal operator ∆, the compu-
tational complexity of deciding Kji |= ν  ν−j is in Θ
P
2 [31], i.e. the problem can be solved
in polynomial time on a deterministic Turing maching, using a logarithmic number of calls720
to an NP-oracle. Since ΣP2 represents the problems which can be solved in polynomial time
on a non-deterministic Turing machine with an NP-oracle, we can conclude that deciding
whether a known PNE exists is in ΣP2 . Similarly, we can decide whether a possible PNE
exists by ﬁrst guessing an outcome ν. The latter involves checking possibilistic entailments
in GPL. Since the formula ν−j ≻c ν only contains the modal operator Π, the computational725
complexity of deciding Kji 6|= ν−j ≻c ν is in NP [31]. Deciding whether K
j
i 6|= ν−j ≻c ν holds
can thus be done using an NP-oracle. Consequently, deciding whether a possible PNE exists
is in ΣP2 .
We can conclude that both problems are ΣP2 -complete.
Similarly as for Proposition 2, the result of Proposition 3 shows that considering incom-730
plete information about the preferences of other agents does not lead to an increase in the
computational complexity of the main decision problems.
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6. An Application to Negotiation
In this section we present an application of Boolean games with incomplete preference-
information. In particular, we develop a multilateral negotiation protocol which allows the735
agents to use their knowledge about other agents’ goals. We analyze how a lack of knowledge
aﬀects the agreement outcome. In particular, we show how knowledgeable agents can obtain
a more desirable outcome than others.
Negotiating allows agents in a strategic setting to settle on an agreement outcome. A mul-
tilateral bargaining protocol in Boolean games with complete information has been investig-740
ated in [14], showing that, when the logical structure of the goals is restricted, the protocol
is guaranteed to end in a Pareto optimal outcome, i.e. no agent can improve its position
without another agent being worse oﬀ. In this section, we propose a protocol which converges
to an acceptable agreement without restrictions on the game structure. Moreover, under
complete information our protocol always results in a discrimin optimal outcome. Discrimin745
optimality reﬁnes Pareto optimality [18], and while the latter indeed ensures efficiency, it
is often not suﬃcient to characterize desirable outcomes [32]. Suppose, for instance, that
two agents are negotiating in a situation with two Pareto optimal outcomes, with utility
vectors (1, 0.2) and (0.5, 0.6), where utility reﬂects the degree of satisfaction of the agents.
A natural concept arising in negotiation is fairness : intuitively, the latter utility vector is750
more fair than the former in the sense that there is less inequality between the utilities of
the two agents. In the literature, several notions of fairness apart from discrimin optimality
have been introduced and studied; we refer the interested reader to [33] for an overview and
discussion.
The literature on bargaining is extensive, and covers a wide range of possible settings, such755
as discrete versus continuous bargaining (e.g. prices [34]), bilateral [35, 36] versus multilat-
eral bargaining, transferable and non-transferable utility, a limited versus unlimited num-
ber of responses, modeling incomplete knowledge through probability theory [34], through
Cartesian products of so-called complete knowledge problems [37], or by means of possibil-
istic logic [35]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the ﬁrst research on negotiation760
that considers incomplete knowledge about the goals of other agents in a Boolean game
setting.
This section is structured as follows. In Section 6.1 we propose a multilateral negotiation
protocol for Boolean games with complete information and characterize the agreement out-
comes. Then we generalize the negotiation protocol of Section 6.1 to Boolean games with765
incomplete information in Section 6.2. We characterize the agreement outcomes, linking
back to those under complete information. Additionally, we show how knowledge is crucial
for an agent to reach a satisfying agreement. To conclude, we discuss several future work
directions.
6.1. Negotiating under Complete Information770
We investigate multilateral negotiation in Boolean games with prioritized goal bases (see
Deﬁnition 1). We use the following scenario as a running example.
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Example 14. Recall Example 1 where Alice and Bob, who share a car, are planning their
afternoon. Alice controls Φ1 = {bA, fA, dA} and Bob controls Φ2 = {bB, fB}, respectively
expressing the actions of going to the beach, going to the forest and taking the dog (in Alice’s
case). The game is constrained by δ = ¬(bB ∧ fB)∧¬(bA ∧ fA)∧ (bB → ¬fA)∧ (bA → ¬fB).
The goal bases of Alice and Bob are:
Γ1 = {fA ∧ fB ∧ dA; bA ∧ bB ∧ dA; dA}
Γ2 = {bB ∧ bA ∧ ¬dA; bB ∧ bA; fB ∧ fA}
In the context of bargaining, it is natural that agents try to achieve an outcome that is,
among others, eﬃcient. A well-known eﬃciency concept is Pareto optimality. Recall that an
outcome is Pareto optimal if no agent can be better oﬀ without another agent being worse775
oﬀ (see Deﬁnition 5). It is easy to see that every Boolean game has at least one Pareto
optimal outcome. A well-known reﬁnement of the Pareto ordering incorporating a notion
of fairness is the discrimin ordering (see Deﬁnition 6). In Example 14, (bA, bB, dA) is the
unique discrimin optimal outcome, although it is not the only Pareto optimal outcome.
We are interested in a negotiation protocol that is guaranteed to converge within a ﬁnite780
number of steps. Therefore, we want agents to make oﬀers according to a negotiation rule,
which ensures that every oﬀered outcome is an improvement compared to the previous one.
For instance, an agent might only be allowed to make a counteroﬀer if no agent is worse
oﬀ than in the previous oﬀer. Obviously, this rule will lead to Pareto optimal outcomes.
However, the rule is so strict that the result can hardly be called fair: the ﬁrst agent simply785
oﬀers the outcome which yields its personal highest utility and no other agent is allowed to
make a counteroﬀer which lowers the ﬁrst agent’s utility. Suppose, for instance, that there are
two possible utility vectors: (1, 0) and (0.5, 0.5). If the ﬁrst agent opens the negotiation with
(1, 0), the other agent would not be allowed to counter this oﬀer with (0.5, 0.5). To develop
a fairer rule, we consider two properties that characterize a valid counteroﬀer. First of all,790
an agent is only interested in making a counteroﬀer if its own utility improves compared to
the original oﬀer. Second, the agents apply the silver rule or ethic of reciprocity, proposed
by the Confucian Way of Humanity [38]:
One should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated.
In our negotiation protocol, an agent reasons as follows: if I do not accept an oﬀer of utility k,
I should not lower another agent’s utility to k or less in order to improve my own. Therefore,
if an agent decides to lower other agents’ utilities, it should oﬀer more than k. We formally
deﬁne the set co(i, ν) of agent i’s legal counteroﬀers to the proposal ν as follows, where
i ∈ N and ν ∈ S:
co(i, ν) = {ν ′ ∈ S | ui(ν
′) > ui(ν) ∧ ∀j ∈ N : uj(ν
′) < uj(ν)⇒ uj(ν
′) > ui(ν)} (9)
We suggest the following negotiation protocol. In a given order, agents make proposals one795
by one. Without loss of generality, we assume that this order is 1, 2, . . . , n.
Algorithm 1 depends on a selection function to choose which ν ′ ∈ S is made as the initial
oﬀer and which ν ′ ∈ co(i, ν) is chosen each time as the counteroﬀer. The results discussed
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Algorithm 1 Negotiation Protocol for Boolean game
ν ← ν ′ with ν ′ ∈ S % Agent 1 proposes ν ′
accepted ← 1; i← 2
while accepted < n do
if co(i, ν) == ∅ then
% Agent i accepts the offer
accepted ← accepted +1
else
% Agent i rejects the offer and makes a counteroffer
ν ← ν ′ with ν ′ ∈ co(i, ν)
accepted ← 1
end if
i← (i == n ? 1 : i+ 1)
end while
in the paper hold regardless of this selection. The negotiation protocol ends if an oﬀer ν is
made such that no counteroﬀers can be made, i.e. ∀i ∈ N : co(i, ν) = ∅.800
If we apply Algorithm 1 in the context of Example 14, Alice is the ﬁrst agent to make
a proposal. Suppose she proposes to Bob the unique outcome corresponding to her ﬁrst
priority goal of going to the forest with Bob and her dog, i.e. ν1 = {fA, fB, dA,¬bA,¬bB}.
The associated utility vector is (1, 0.33). Bob now looks into his possible counteroﬀers, i.e.
co(2, ν1). First of all, Bob has to be better oﬀ in his own counteroﬀer and should thus have805
utility 0.67 or greater. Therefore, the only candidates for co(2, ν1) are going to the beach
exclusively with Alice and going to the beach with Alice and the dog. The second condition
for co(2, ν1) regards Alice’s utility: if Alice’s utility in Bob’s counteroﬀer is lower than in ν1,
then her utility in the counteroﬀer should be strictly greater than 0.33 (i.e. Bob’s utility in
Alice’s proposal), or it should thus be at least 0.67. Given that Alice has utility 0 if she is810
not with her dog, the only possible counteroﬀer for Bob is going to the beach with Alice and
the dog, i.e. ν2 = {bB, bA, dA,¬fA,¬fB}. In other words, co(2, ν1) = {ν2}. Bob thus makes
the counteroﬀer ν2 with associated utility vector (0.67, 0.67). If Alice now wants to make
another counteroﬀer, then by deﬁnition of co(1, ν2) both Alice and Bob should have utility 1
in this counteroﬀer, or Alice should have utility 1 and Bob should keep utility 0.67. Clearly815
no such counteroﬀers exist, i.e. co(1, ν2) = ∅. Alice therefore accepts Bob’s oﬀer ν2 and the
protocol ends. Bob and Alice have agreed to go to the beach with the dog.
We now prove that, whenever an oﬀer is rejected, the new oﬀer is fairer according to the
discrimin ordering.
Proposition 4. For ν ∈ S, i ∈ N and ν ′ ∈ co(i, ν), it holds that ν ′ >discr ν.820








For every j /∈ eq(U(ν),U(ν ′)) either uj(ν
′) > uj(ν) holds or uj(ν
′) < uj(ν) holds by
deﬁnition of eq(U(ν),U(ν ′)). For every j /∈ eq(U(ν),U(ν ′)) such that uj(ν
′) > uj(ν)
holds, we have uj(ν
′) > minj′ /∈eq(U(ν),U(ν′)) uj′(ν) by deﬁnition of the minimum. For every
j /∈ eq(U(ν),U(ν ′)) such that uj(ν
′) < uj(ν) holds, the deﬁnition of co(i, ν) (9) implies
that uj(ν
′) > ui(ν). Moreover, (9) implies that i /∈ eq(U(ν),U(ν
′)). Consequently, we825
have uj(ν
′) > minj′ /∈eq(U(ν),U(ν′)) uj′(ν). Combining all parts, we see that the inequality
uj(ν
′) > minj′ /∈eq(U(ν),U(ν′)) uj′(ν) holds for every j /∈ eq(U(ν),U(ν
′)), thus implying what
needed to be proven.
It immediately follows that every discrimin optimal outcome is accepted.
Corollary 2. For ν ∈ DO and i ∈ N it holds that co(i, ν) = ∅.830
Conversely, we can also show that only discrimin optimal outcomes will be overall accepted,
i.e. accepted by every agent.
Proposition 5. For ν ∈ S \ DO there is an agent i ∈ N with co(i, ν) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let ν ∈ S \DO , then by deﬁnition of DO there exists a ν ′ ∈ S such that ν ′ >discr ν.







Since the number of agents is ﬁnite, there exists at least one agent i outside eq(U(ν),U(ν ′))
such that ui(ν) = minj /∈eq(U(ν),U(ν′)) uj(ν). In other words: of all agents for which the choice835
between ν and ν ′ matters, agent i has the lowest utility in ν. In particular, since ν ′ >discr ν,
it holds that ui(ν
′) > ui(ν). Moreover, since minj /∈eq(U(ν),U(ν′)) uj(ν
′) > ui(ν), it holds that
uj(ν
′) > ui(ν) for every j /∈ eq(U(ν),U(ν
′)). In particular, uj(ν
′) > ui(ν) for every j ∈ N :
uj(ν
′) < uj(ν). Therefore, it immediately follows that ν
′ ∈ co(i, ν).
Note that since there are only a ﬁnite number of oﬀers that can be made, and because840
each oﬀer must strictly improve the previous oﬀer in terms of the discrimin ordering, we
know that the negotiation protocol always ends. From Corollary 2 and Proposition 5 we
moreover know that the possible agreement outcomes at the end of the negotiation protocol
are exactly the discrimin optimal outcomes. This result implies that the ﬁrst oﬀering agent
still has a strong advantage, as this agent can select the discrimin optimal outcome that845
yields its highest personal utility, which no agent is allowed to reject. For instance, if the
only discrimin optimal outcomes have utility vectors (1, 0.5) and (0.5, 1), agent 1 should
propose the former and agent 2 has no choice but to accept. If the ﬁrst agent follows this
strategy, the negotiation ends within one step.
Remark 1. In our protocol, it is irrelevant which agent controls which atoms. The depend-850
ence of actions implied by the constraint δ forces agents to negotiate about what actions
they will undertake. In Example 14, Alice and Bob cannot individually decide to go out.
However, Alice can decide to stay with the dog without violating δ. Moreover, both Alice
and Bob can decide to stay at home without restricting the other agent’s options w.r.t. the
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constraint. Thus Alice is able to reach a utility of 0.33 without negotiating, and Bob will855
be stuck with a utility of 0. The utility vector (0.33, 0) can be viewed as the disagreement
point [39], i.e. the utility the agents would receive if they fail to reach an agreement. This
information could be added to the framework: Alice rejects everything with a lower utility
than 0.33, ergo Bob should not make such oﬀers during the negotiation. Note that we can
incorporate this info in the constraint δ, demanding that the utility of every agent is greater860
than its disagreement utility.
6.2. Negotiating under Incomplete Information
In this section, we consider Boolean games in which the agents are uncertain about the
preferences of the other agents. For example, recall the context of Example 14 where Bob
and Alice are planning their Sunday afternoon: they can go to the beach or the forest, or865
they can stay at home, and Alice can bring the dog or leave it at home. Since being a couple
does not imply having identical preferences nor knowing exactly each other’s preferences,
Bob and Alice will have to compromise under incomplete information. However, they might
not be completely ignorant about each other’s goals; for instance, Bob knows that Alice
loves the dog and Alice knows that Bob loves the beach. In this section, we show how they870
can use such knowledge to reach an agreement through negotiation. Moreover, we explore
the link between having information about other agents’ goals and obtaining a satisfactory
agreement. To the best of our knowledge, our process is the ﬁrst multilateral negotiation
protocol for Boolean games that takes uncertainty w.r.t. the other agents’ goals into account.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a set of possibilistic discrimin optimal outcomes in S. Intuitively, an875
outcome ν is optimal if for any outcome ν ′ which dominates ν according to the discrimin
ordering, the agents who are better oﬀ in ν ′ than in ν are not aware that ν ′ is a valid coun-
teroﬀer in the sense of (9). Recall that the models of a generalized possibilistic knowledge
base Kji are possibility distributions.
Definition 18 (Possibilistic Discrimin). We deﬁne the set of possibilistic discrimin op-
timal outcomes:
DOp = {ν ∈ S | ∀ν ′ ∈ S : (ν ′ >discr ν)⇒
(
∀i ∈ N : (ui(ν
′) > ui(ν))⇒
(∃j ∈ N, ∃uji ∈ Mod(K
j
i ) : (u
j
i (ν






It is easy to see that DO ⊆ DOp. In particular, when each agent has full knowledge, i.e.880
Mod(Kji ) = {uj} for every i, j ∈ N , DO and DO
p coincide.
We now analyze negotiation in Boolean games with incomplete preference-information.
The protocol remains as speciﬁed in Algorithm 1: agents take turns in responding to an oﬀer,
by accepting it or making a counteroﬀer. However, the set of legal counteroﬀers co(i, ν) might
be unknown to agent i. Indeed, determining the allowed counteroﬀers requires – possibly
unknown – information about the other agents’ utility. Therefore, we replace co(i, ν) by
cop(i, ν), which intuitively contains every outcome ν ′ ∈ S for which agent i has enough
information to derive that ν ′ is indeed a legal counteroﬀer to ν:
cop(i, ν) = {ν ′ ∈ S | (Kii |= ν
′ ≻ ν) ∧ ∀j ∈ N : Kji |= (∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′) ∨ (ν ′  ν))}
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Recall that an outcome ν, when used as a formula, represents the conjunction of the literals
in ν. Moreover, as deﬁned in (7), ν ′ ≻ ν and ν ′  ν are abbreviations of GPL formulas.
When agent i’s knowledge base Kji models ν
′ ≻ ν, this means that agent i knows that the
utility of agent j in ν ′ is higher than its utility in ν. Similarly, Kji |= ν
′  ν encodes that885
agent i knows that the utility of agent j in ν ′ is at least as high as its utility in ν. If Kji
models the GPL formula ∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′), this means that agent i knows that agent j’s utility
in ν ′ is higher than ui(ν). As before, an outcome ν is agreed upon iﬀ co
p(i, ν) = ∅ for every
i ∈ N .
We can prove that every possibilistic discrimin optimal outcome is generally accepted.890
To this end, we ﬁrst prove the following link between the sets of valid counteroﬀers under
complete and incomplete information, assuming the agents have correct beliefs about the
preferences of others. By the latter we mean that the beliefs of an agent i concerning the
utility of an agent j do not rule out the true utility function of an agent j.
Proposition 6. For every i ∈ N such that ∀j ∈ N : uj ∈ Mod(K
j
i ) it holds that co
p(i, ν) ⊆895
co(i, ν) for every ν ∈ S.
Proof. Let ν ′ be an arbitrary element of cop(i, ν). By deﬁnition, it holds that ui(ν
′) >
ui(ν) ∧ ∀j ∈ N : K
j
i |= (∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′) ∨ (ν ′  ν)). Let j ∈ N . It remains to prove that
uj(ν
′) < uj(ν)⇒ uj(ν
′) > ui(ν) or equivalently uj(ν
′) ≥ uj(ν)∨uj(ν
′) > ui(ν). It is assumed
that uj is a model of K
j
i . Consequently, it holds that uj satisﬁes either∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′) or ν ′  ν.900
In the ﬁrst case, it holds that uj(ν




′) > ui(ν). In the second case,
it holds that uj(ν
′) ≥ uj(ν). In any case it holds that uj(ν
′) ≥ uj(ν) ∨ uj(ν
′) > ui(ν).
We can prove that an agent always accepts a possibilistic discrimin optimal outcome, as-
suming it has correct beliefs.
Proposition 7. For ν ∈ DOp and i ∈ N such that ∀j ∈ N : uj ∈ Mod(K
j
i ) it holds that905
cop(i, ν) = ∅.
Proof. Let ν ∈ DOp and i ∈ N . Suppose there exists some ν ′ ∈ cop(i, ν). If ¬(ν ′ >discr ν),
then Proposition 4 and Proposition 6 imply that ν ′ /∈ cop(i, ν), which is a contradiction.
Now assume that ν ′ >discr ν. Since ν
′ ∈ cop(i, ν) and Mod(Kii) = {ui} it follows that
ui(ν
′) > ui(ν). Because ν ∈ DO
p, we know that there exists some j ∈ N and uji ∈ Mod(K
j
i )910
such that uji (ν
′) < uji (ν) and u
j
i (ν
′) ≤ ui(ν). Consequently, u
j
i does not satisfy ∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′),
nor ν ′  ν. This contradicts the fact that Kji |= (∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′) ∨ (ν ′  ν)).
Conversely, we can also show that only possibilistic discrimin optimal outcomes will be
generally accepted, i.e. accepted by all agents.
Proposition 8. For ν ∈ S \ DOp there is an agent i ∈ N with cop(i, ν) 6= ∅.915
Proof. For ν ∈ S \ DOp there exists a ν ′ ∈ S such that ν ′ >discr ν and there exists an
agent i ∈ N such that ui(ν




i ) it holds that
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uji (ν
′) ≥ uji (ν) or u
j
i (ν
′) > ui(ν). Since Mod(K
i
i) = {ui}, it follows that K
i
i |= ν
′ ≻ ν. Now
let j be an arbitrary agent in N . For every model uji of K
j
i such that u
j
i (ν
′) ≥ uji (ν) it holds
that uji models ν
′  ν. For every model uji of K
j
i such that u
j
i (ν
′) > ui(ν) it holds that920
uji models ∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′). Consequently, we have Kji |= (∆ui(ν)+ 1p
(ν ′) ∨ (ν ′  ν)), and thus
ν ′ ∈ cop(i, ν).
Note that since the number of possible oﬀers is ﬁnite and because each oﬀer must strictly
improve the previous oﬀer in terms of the discrimin ordering, the negotiation protocol always
ends when we assume correct beliefs. Note that incorrect beliefs, however, can lead to an925
inﬁnite loop: if agent 1 believes ν is a valid counteroﬀer to ν ′ and agent 2 believes that ν ′ is a
valid counteroﬀer to ν, then a negotiation between the both of them can loop inﬁnitely from
ν to ν ′ and vice versa. From Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 we know that the possible
agreement outcomes at the end of the negotiation protocol are exactly the possibilistic
discrimin optimal outcomes, assuming the agents have correct beliefs.930
From DO ⊆ DOp and Proposition 7, it follows that any discrimin optimal oﬀer is overall
accepted under incomplete information. However, Example 15 shows that the opposite
does not hold, i.e. a non-discrimin optimal outcome might be accepted under incomplete
information.
Example 15. Suppose, in the context of Example 14, that Alice has absolutely no informa-935
tion concerning Bob’s goals. If Bob may make the ﬁrst oﬀer and suggests to go to the beach
together without the dog, Alice’s utility is 0. Although this outcome is discrimin dominated
by going to the beach with the dog, Alice is unable to make this counteroﬀer, because she
does not know whether Bob’s utility is at least 0.33 in that case or whether Bob’s utility is
at least the same as in his ﬁrst oﬀer.940
Note that, in contrast to a fully informed agent, an agent with limited knowledge might not
be able to open with a discrimin-optimal solution. It is clear that having no information
leaves an agent in a very weak position. Indeed, if agent i knows nothing about the prefer-
ences of another agent, it holds that cop(i, ν) = ∅ for every ν ∈ S, hence agent i is obliged to
accept every oﬀer. In contrast, an agent who has full knowledge knows all valid counteroﬀers945
and may be able to achieve a better outcome than in any discrimin optimal outcome, cfr.
Bob in Example 15. Note that an agent with full knowledge can either use a safe or a risky
selection function. Suppose for instance that there are only three possible utility vectors:
(0.6, 0.4), (0.4, 0.6) and (1, 0.2). If agent 1 proposes (0.6, 0.4), it is certain that agent 2 ac-
cepts. Alternatively, if agent 1 proposes (1, 0.2) and agent 2 does not know that there exists950
a valid counteroﬀer, agent 1 can get away with an unfair agreement, yielding a higher utility
than in any fair outcome. However, if agent 2 knows that (0.4, 0.6) is a valid counteroﬀer,
the negotiations end in (0.4, 0.6), leaving agent 1 worse oﬀ than if it had proposed (0.6, 0.4)
right away. This discussion shows that an interesting extension of the framework would be
to allow agents to reason about the knowledge of others. Such knowledge can be encoded955
using multi-agent extensions of modal logics for epistemic reasoning, although we are then
forced to express knowledge about preferences at the propositional level (e.g. by introducing
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variables gmi to denote the m
th most preferred goal of agent i as in Section 4). This exten-
sion would allow agents to act based on their knowledge of how other agents would react to
various counteroﬀers, as is common in the ﬁeld of epistemic game theory [40].960
Remark 2. In our protocol, the order of the agents plays an important role, which is
natural in hierarchical contexts (e.g. leader-follower type setting, where followers can only
question proposals by leaders if they can prove their unfairness). Alternatively, the power
of agents [41] can be used to deduce a sensible ordering in which agents are allowed to
make oﬀers: the most powerful agent can make the initial oﬀer. Note, however, that the965
use of GPL for encoding knowledge about the preferences of others is independent of the
negotiation protocol. Consequently, future research w.r.t. alternative negotiation protocols
e.g. for settings in which agents have equal status can also rely on our GPL framework.
Even though the negotiation model we have discussed in this section is rather simple, it
oﬀers a rich basis from which we can study a wide variety of settings. Interesting extensions970
could include the use of agents who expand their knowledge base during the protocol, by
drawing conclusions from the oﬀering behavior of other agents [42]. Another option is to use
diﬀerent negotiation rules, e.g. an agent could be allowed to make a counteroﬀer ν if it does
not know that ν is an illegal counteroﬀer. However, if the oﬀer turns out to be illegal, the
agent must pay a penatly. In that case, agents need to weigh the potential gain of such an975
oﬀer against the risk of paying a penalty, which brings them in a standard setting for decision
making under uncertainty (see e.g. [43]). Alternatively, we can allow ‘third party’ agents to
protest against oﬀers, in case they know that the oﬀer is illegal. This can also be employed
in case the assumption of correct beliefs is violated. Recall that the characterization of
the agreement outcomes under incomplete information relies on this assumption. When an980
agent has incorrect beliefs, it is possible that the agent makes a counteroﬀer that violates
the original bargaining rule, while believing it does not. For instance, suppose Bob suggests
to Alice to attend a sports game together. Now assume Alice mistakingly believes Bob is
indiﬀerent between attending a sports game together and going to the theatre together,
while Alice prefers the latter. She therefore believes going to the theatre together is a valid985
counteroﬀer. If she makes this oﬀer, Bob can deduce that Alice’s beliefs concerning his
preferences are wrong. He could protest against the counteroﬀer and Alice could update her
beliefs. However, protesting against an unfair proposal requires the revelation of knowledge,
which might also weaken the bargaining power of the agent. Hence, it is not straightforward
that protesting is always in the protester’s advantage, even if it initially leads to a higher990
utility. Other options for alternative protocols include the addition of time constraints [44]
or the use of arguments to support an oﬀer [35].
7. Conclusion
We introduced the ﬁrst Boolean game frameworks that allow agents to be uncertain
about the other agents’ goals. Moreover, we approached the incompleteness of information995
in two distinct ways. In Section 4 we have argued that such a scenario can naturally be
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modelled by associating with each agent a possibility distribution over the universe of all
possible games (given the considered action variables and constraints). While this allows us
to deﬁne a variety of solution concepts in a natural way, deﬁnitions at the semantic level are
not directly useful in practice, due to the exponential size of these possibility distributions.1000
Therefore, we also proposed a syntactic characterization, which avoids exponential repres-
entations by relying on standard possibilistic logic inference, and can be implemented by
reduction to answer set programming. Our main result is that this syntactic characterization
indeed corresponds to the intended semantic deﬁnitions. We furthermore showed that the
computational complexity of the introduced solution concepts remains at the second level1005
of the polynomial hierarchy.
In Section 5 we have developed an alternative framework for Boolean games with in-
complete information, using GPL to compactly represent agents’ knowledge about the pref-
erences of others. In contrast to the previous approach, here the possibility distributions
correspond to utility functions, hence the weights of formulas reﬂect preference instead of cer-1010
tainty. An agent then considers a set of possibility distributions as being the possible utility
functions of another agent. We illustrated how the syntax of GPL allows us to easily model
intuitive notions: not only can we capture necessary and suﬃcient conditions for reaching
subgoals, it is also straightforward to encode e.g. comparative preferences. Moreover, in
contrast to the framework from Section 4, the GPL-based model does not require additional1015
variables in the logical language. However, the approach from Section 4 allows diﬀerent
degrees of certainty, whereas the GPL-based model corresponds to binary certainty: either
an agent completely rules a scenario out or it considers a scenario completely possible. To
the best of our knowledge, our frameworks are the ﬁrst models for Boolean games with
incomplete information regarding the agents’ goals.1020
We introduced new solution concepts, which are appropriate for this context. They reﬂect
whether an outcome is known to be a PNE or whether it is considered possible of being a
PNE. For instance, in case of a known PNE, all agents believe that no other agent has the
incentive to deviate. Moreover, we investigated the associated computational complexity
and showed that this complexity does not increase compared to PNEs in Boolean games1025
with complete information.
To illustrate how the proposed frameworks could be used in practice, we presented an
application to negotiation in the context of Boolean games with incomplete information.
Our multilateral negotiation protocol uses an intuitive negotiation rule based on the ethic
of reciprocity principle and is guaranteed to converge within a ﬁnite number of steps. We1030
characterized the set of possible outcomes of the negotiation process, conﬁrming the intuition
that incomplete knowledge may lead to negotiation ineﬃciency, i.e. the agreement outcome
may not be fair or eﬃcient.
The presented frameworks lead to several interesting avenues for future work. First,
the approaches could be generalized for taking into account prior beliefs about the likely1035
behaviour of other players (e.g. for modelling collusion) and/or for modelling situations where
agents may be uncertain about the actions that are being played by other agents. Moreover,
it seems of interest to analyse the eﬀect of adding communication to the framework, by
allowing agents to strategically ask questions or make proposals to each other in order to
35
reduce uncertainty or as part of a negotiation process.1040
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